Fragmented Unity: Patronage Politics and Regime Resilience in China
The remarkable resilience of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has long puzzled social scientists and policymakers, as the system lacks many good institutions that are commonly deemed as essential for high-quality governance: Electoral institutions that regulate power transitions and promote accountability are nowhere in existence except at the grassroots level. The political system also has a poor reputation for being ridden with rampant factionalism and corruption. What, then, accounts for the regime's ability to endure and develop in light of these glaring institutional deficiencies?
Departing from the prevailing view of the literature that authoritarian regimes extend their longevity primarily by revamping their institutions to mimic (although imperfectly) their democratic counterparts, this book offers an alternative perspective for understanding the CCP's resilience by tracing its roots to the enduring and informal aspect of the system. Focusing on the intra-elite patron-client networks, I argue that, contrary to the conventional view that they are merely a symptom of backward and corrupt patrimonial regimes, these informal networks make important contributions to the stability and effectiveness of the regime by fostering trust and cooperation among political actors in an environment where credibility is usually in short supply. The coordination capacity that these networks afford in turn helps support the proper functioning of formal institutions, and allows elites to engage in collective undertakings that address some of the most pressing problems that the regime faces.
To substantiate my argument, I draw on a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. The quantitative analysis is based on an original biographical database of over 4,000 Chinese politicians who have served at city, provincial, and national leadership positions since the late 1990s. The database, partially supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation (SES-1560513), provides so far the broadest and most granular coverage of contemporary Chinese elites among all existing sources. The quantitative analysis is supplemented with case studies and in-depth interviews with current and retired government officials, experts, and journalists from six provinces where I did my fieldwork. Examining a range of policy areas, such as economic development, pollution control, land market reform, and anticorruption enforcement, my empirical analysis demonstrates that patron-client ties play a key role in helping regime elites accomplish tasks crucial to their collective survival. At the same time, however, reliance on these informal networks also creates perverse consequences, such as corruption and cronyism. This dual nature of patronage politics thus explains why blatant pathology and impressive performance coexist with each other under the current Chinese regime.
My dissertation received the 2018 APSA Mancur Olson Award (honorable mention) for best dissertation in political economy.
Departing from the prevailing view of the literature that authoritarian regimes extend their longevity primarily by revamping their institutions to mimic (although imperfectly) their democratic counterparts, this book offers an alternative perspective for understanding the CCP's resilience by tracing its roots to the enduring and informal aspect of the system. Focusing on the intra-elite patron-client networks, I argue that, contrary to the conventional view that they are merely a symptom of backward and corrupt patrimonial regimes, these informal networks make important contributions to the stability and effectiveness of the regime by fostering trust and cooperation among political actors in an environment where credibility is usually in short supply. The coordination capacity that these networks afford in turn helps support the proper functioning of formal institutions, and allows elites to engage in collective undertakings that address some of the most pressing problems that the regime faces.
To substantiate my argument, I draw on a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. The quantitative analysis is based on an original biographical database of over 4,000 Chinese politicians who have served at city, provincial, and national leadership positions since the late 1990s. The database, partially supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation (SES-1560513), provides so far the broadest and most granular coverage of contemporary Chinese elites among all existing sources. The quantitative analysis is supplemented with case studies and in-depth interviews with current and retired government officials, experts, and journalists from six provinces where I did my fieldwork. Examining a range of policy areas, such as economic development, pollution control, land market reform, and anticorruption enforcement, my empirical analysis demonstrates that patron-client ties play a key role in helping regime elites accomplish tasks crucial to their collective survival. At the same time, however, reliance on these informal networks also creates perverse consequences, such as corruption and cronyism. This dual nature of patronage politics thus explains why blatant pathology and impressive performance coexist with each other under the current Chinese regime.
My dissertation received the 2018 APSA Mancur Olson Award (honorable mention) for best dissertation in political economy.